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Abstract
Increasingly short-term, opportunistic, adver-
sarial politics has consistently constrained
and compromised significant and genuine tax
reform in Australia. This article reviews the
various attempts at tax reform since Asprey in
the mid-1970s, assesses the existing tax system
and attempts to set out the major essential
ingredients of genuine tax reform in this
country. Tax reform is seen as particularly
urgent.
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1. Introduction
Whenever one thinks of the issue of tax
reform, and in particular the political and other
processes on this issue, over the last 40 years
or so, Monty Python and the search for the
Holy Grail come to mind. Perhaps it is no
coincidence that Python and Asprey’s Taxation
Review Committee report both were released
in 1975. I will leave it to you to decide, who,
among the political and other players over this
period, best encapsulates King Arthur and his
Knights of the Round Table: Sir Bedevere the
Wise, Sir Lancelot the Brave, Sir Robin the
Not-Quite-So-Brave-As-Sir-Lancelot, and the
aptly named Sir Not Appearing in This Film
and Sir Galahad the Pure.
Perhaps it is also quite instructive to recall
the section of Scene 3 of the movie, where
Arthur is under some pressure to prove his
legitimacy to a couple of peasants:
King Arthur: I am your king.
Peasant Woman: Well, I didn’t vote for you.
King Arthur: You don’t vote for kings.
Peasant Woman: Well, ’ow did you become king,
then?
King Arthur: The Lady of the Lake,
[angels sing]
her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite,
held aloft Excalibur from the bosom of the water
signifying by Divine Providence that I, Arthur,
was to carry Excalibur.
[singing stops]
That is why I am your king!
Dennis the Peasant: Listen—strange woman
lying in ponds distributing swords is no basis for
a system of government. Supreme executive
power derives from a mandate from the masses,
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not from some farcical aquatic ceremony.
King Arthur: Be quiet!
Dennis the Peasant: You can’t expect to wield
supreme power just ’cause some watery tart
threw a sword at you!
King Arthur:Shut up!
Dennis the Peasant: I mean, if I went around
sayin’ I was an emperor just because some moist-
ened bint had lobbed a scimitar at me they’d put
me away!
In the run up to the Abbott Government’s
promised review or White Paper on Australia’s
tax system, it is important to pose the question
of just how many of the country’s successive
Arthurs, or their knights, since the mid-1970s
really can claim ‘legitimacy’ in terms of
genuine, appropriate and sustained tax reform,
especially in light of the significant changes in
Australia’s economic and social environment
over those years and the policy challenges that
have accompanied them.
The following section provides an overview
of the key taxation reviews since the mid-
1970s: Section 3 discusses the current tax
policy settings, and Section 4 offers recommen-
dations for successful tax and transfer reform.
2. Key Reviews since Asprey
In raising this question of genuine, appropriate
and sustained tax reform, one certainly cannot
ignore nor deny the considerable progress that
has been made, albeit slowly, in reforming
many aspects of Australia’s tax and transfer
systems.
As Ken Henry pointed out in his opening
address to the Post-Henry Review Conference
in 2010, while ‘Asprey’s recommendations
received little attention from the Whitlam and
Fraser Governments . . . the issues it raised did
not disappear’. Indeed, ‘the major reforms of
the 1980s’ (capital gains tax, fringe benefits
tax, dividend imputation, large cuts to personal
and business income tax rates), the taxation of
foreign-sourced income in 1990 and a broad-
based consumption tax in 1998 ‘were all
stimulated by Asprey. They all sought to
broaden the base and, to the extent possible,
cut the statutory rates of tax’.
Also, as Henry pointed out, ‘the Asprey
Report provided more than a series of recom-
mendations. It also provided an enduring
vision for tax system design’. However, it is
important to recognise that Asprey was deliv-
ered when the Australian economy was very
insular and isolated, heavily protected and
inward-looking and heavily regulated.
By the time the Asprey report was being
implemented, Australia’s place in the world
was very different, most notably having
become an open economy with a floating
exchange rate. This would certainly have
produced different recommendations; for
example, the revenue foregone by moving to an
imputation system to benefit domestic savers
might have been better directed at corporate tax
deduction to attract foreign investment.
As Henry noted, there was an important dif-
ference in the approach of Asprey and the
review that he led. Asprey ‘first settled the
broad outline, or vision, of the kind of tax
system that should be established over time,
and worked back from that to determine what
changes would best support that vision’. In
doing so, Asprey moved beyond revenue
adequacy as the sole motivation of tax policy,
also seeking ‘to achieve a balance between the
traditional tax policy objectives of simplicity,
efficiency and equity’.
The Henry Review ‘added the principles of
sustainability and policy consistency’ to the
traditional tax policy objectives. As such,
Henry did not focus on ‘optimal tax system
design’, but rather ‘positioned the tax and
transfer system in a broader public policy
context’. As such, he focused on ‘how Austra-
lia’s tax and transfer system could best meet
the nation’s opportunities and challenges over
the next 40 years’, arising from deepening
international integration, frequent and rapid
technological advances, an ageing population,
strong population growth with increasing cul-
tural diversity, deepening stresses between
human activities and ecosystems, and pres-
sures affecting housing affordability and urban
amenity. To quote the review:
The review has aimed to set strategic directions
for the future architecture of the Australian tax
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and transfer system. It has not produced a one-off
tax policy package, and it has not advanced the
detailed design or timing of measures. Indeed, it
is neither possible nor desirable to make all of
these changes (138 recommendations) too
quickly.
All the main provisos or qualifications were
emphasised in order to set the review in its
broader policy context: the settings of other
policies, slow processes in changing market
behaviour and the need for adjustment pro-
cesses, the need for intergovernmental coop-
eration, the importance of overall fiscal and
macroeconomic settings in a global context,
and the need to give people time to readjust
their affairs.
As a broad ‘pathway document’, the review
clearly met all its objectives, although obvi-
ously there has been, and will continue to be,
extensive debate—politically and among aca-
demics, policy types and numerous vested
interests—recommendation by recommenda-
tion, as details are focused on and implemen-
tation is contemplated or attempted.
However, despite all this, the Henry Review
has failed to meet the broader political, media
and community expectations. Irrespective of
what was commissioned or what was said with
its delivery, the expectation was for a ‘tax
package’, carrying with it the further expecta-
tion that the then government would be ‘under
pressure’ to deliver it. To be fair to Henry, it
should be noted that the concept of a ‘package’
was an unreasonable expectation, given that he
was considering the tax and transfer system in
isolation from a detailed consideration of
government-spending trends and commit-
ments. Nevertheless, those expectations were
there, so when they were thwarted, the review
was all too easily dismissed, politically, as
‘just another study/review/inquiry’, easily
shelved by the media, although also all too
easily ‘cherry-picked’, with attempts to imple-
ment just a handful of its recommendations.
Against this background, the government
only picked some ‘high profile’ recommenda-
tions immediately, such as the mining tax, and
when that backfired it then only chose smaller
issues, quietly, leaving the bigger issues like
savings and state taxes untouched.
It is still not widely recognised that the pre-
vious government actually progressed some 40
recommendations, almost one third. It is also
not recognised that the Abbott Government has
quietly unwound seven recommendations,
without significant public comment linking
them to the review’s recommendations. The
Henry Review should remain a benchmark
against which tax proposals and changes are
judged, while it remains contemporary.
As something of a public policy geek, I ini-
tially got involved in politics by coming on
secondment from the Reserve Bank of Austra-
lia (RBA) back in the mid-1970s, and then I
subsequently entered politics in the mid-1980s
in the belief that ‘good policy’ would prove to
be ‘good politics’ with a fairly short lag.
Not only have I had to accept that the lags
turned out to be somewhat longer and, I fear,
are still lengthening as politics increasingly
has become little more than a ‘game’ played
out as point-scoring in the 24-hour media
cycle, but it has been short-term, opportunistic,
populist politics that essentially has prevented
most rational policy debate and implementa-
tion, and delayed the processes of much-
needed reform. Indeed, the history of the tax
and transfer debate since Asprey is littered
with examples of where short-term political
expediency has delayed or prevented genuine
reform. This article already has noted the inac-
tivity on the Asprey recommendations under
both Whitlam and Fraser.
I recall the enthusiasm with which I, and a
number of other bureaucratic and political
advisers, rushed proposals for broad-based
reform, including tax reform with a goods and
services tax (GST), into the Fraser Cabinet in
the early months of 1978, following the gov-
ernment’s re-election with a then historic
majority. The 1977 election was called early,
as Fraser had felt it to be necessary to establish
his legitimacy after the circumstances of the
dismissal of the Whitlam Government in 1975.
Those tax reform proposals were thrown out of
Cabinet almost as fast as they had entered, on
the grounds of ‘likely inflationary conse-
quences’, even though the Fraser Government
enjoyed a majority in both houses of Parlia-
ment and in circumstances where there was
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extreme pressure to bring the budget under
control, even after the Lynch ‘razor gang’ had
attempted quite dramatic cuts in government
spending after the profligacy of the Whitlam
years. Somewhat ironically, it then became
necessary to resort to a ‘temporary tax sur-
charge’ in the 1977 budget to make it look
‘respectable’ and which then had to be made a
permanent tax increase in the budget of the
following year.
The Fraser years also saw the government
and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) left
significantly behind by the so-called tax avoid-
ance industry, with new tax schemes emerging
almost daily, the most blatant of which was the
so-called bottom-of-the-harbour schemes,
which were quite simply raping the business
and personal revenue base.
This cut both ways politically, with direct
and influential business pressure to ‘lay off’
that was increasingly offset by broader com-
munity concern about conspicuous inequity, as
well as some focus on the weakness of the
system in relying on high income tax rates and
inefficient and complex indirect taxes. The
ATO was so far behind in its practical and
legislative response that the government had to
resort to enforcement by press release, with
various schemes and practices ‘knocked off’ as
of the date of the release, even though it took
many months, sometimes longer, to adequately
document and legislate against such schemes
and to draft fairly wide-ranging anti-avoidance
legislation.
The inactivity of the Fraser years and the
aftermath of the tax avoidance era, in the
context of a wages Accord, laid the basis for
genuine reform with the 1984/1985 Hawke/
Keating tax packages and Tax Summit. Surveys
suggested that there was by then widespread
community support for a package that closed
the many tax avoidance loopholes, including by
way of the introduction of new taxes on capital
gains and fringe benefits, and that linked sig-
nificant cuts in personal tax rates to the intro-
duction of a broad-based consumption tax.
The White Paper that was taken to the
Hawke Cabinet in 1985 argued persuasively
that the ‘muddle through’ or ‘potholing’
approach to tax reform was no longer viable.
However, once again, short-term political con-
siderations dominated. First, the Tax Summit
that was held to consider that White Paper
ended with less-than-enthusiastic support for
the proposed ‘reforms’. Second, against this
background, Hawke reached a back-door,
motel room ‘deal’ with then Australian
Council of Trade Unions boss, Bill Kelty, to
kill the consumption tax, with the result that
much of the broad-based reform had to be sac-
rificed, leaving the focus on the so-called
nasties of capital gains and fringe benefits
taxes, and the closing of other loopholes.
It also should be noted that while Hawke
and Keating were able to exploit the electoral
mood that, in large measure, had been driven
by the obscenity and inequity of the tax avoid-
ance era to implement the base-broadening
recommendations of Asprey, they failed to rec-
ognise the significance of Australia’s then
open economy, which might have seen them
not to push on with imputation etc.
My 1993 Fightback package similarly was
very much a victim of short-term politics. The
package promised significant reform of per-
sonal and business taxes, with significant
reductions in income tax rates, the abolition of
several state taxes, such as payroll taxes and
various financial duties, and considerable sim-
plification of personal tax and indirect tax
arrangements, funded by substantial cuts in
government spending and the introduction of a
broad-based GST.
However, Keating ran a very effective scare
campaign against the package, promising to
deliver comparable income tax cuts without a
GST; indeed, he even legislated those tax cuts,
the so-called LAW tax cuts. I personally found
this alarmingly dishonest and galling, espe-
cially from a man who, having had his 1984/85
tax package dudded by Hawke, had gone into
the Parliament proclaiming effectively that he
would die fighting for a broad-based consump-
tion tax. However, his political death had its
origins in his early post-election admission
that he could not actually deliver the promised
LAW tax cuts in the absence of a GST.
The introduction of a GST by the Howard
Government in 1998 also was severely
constrained by politics. Although the decision
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to introduce the tax was in response to pre-
election pressure from the business commu-
nity for the government to demonstrate its
business bona fides, the government bowed to
other political pressures in implementing the
tax that severely constrained its effectiveness
in both the short and longer term. Many in the
government were jolted by the narrow margin
by which they won—or survived—in 1998,
compared with their winning margin in 1996.
Hence, they sought to minimise further politi-
cal difficulties in four respects.
First, the decision to commit all GST
revenue to the states, while a clever, short-term
political move, severely constrained its flex-
ibility as a fiscal instrument moving forward
and ensured that its distribution would be a
significant and growing friction with, and
between, the states.
Second, the ‘deal’ that was done with the
Democrats to ensure passage through the Par-
liament significantly reduced the breadth of
the tax. Unfortunately, as long as the GST is
not applied uniformly, across the board, there
will be pressure on government to grant ‘con-
cessions’. Indeed, governments of either per-
suasion are easily ‘duchessed’ to do this,
receiving positive support and/or media at
little or no apparent cost, case by case. But,
collectively, this rapidly can erode the tax base
and breed a host of other political issues down
the track.
Third, nobody ‘owned it’ at the political
level, thereby leaving the design and imple-
mentation to the ATO and Tax Policy Division
of the Treasury, which took the opportunity to
do some ‘other things’, greatly complicating
and increasing the cost of the implementation
of the tax. Apparently, the Treasury also con-
strained further tax reform by insisting that
none of the revenue raised from the GST could
be used for personal tax reform, thereby neu-
tering the ‘tax base switch’ that was an attrac-
tive and compelling reason for introducing the
GST, over and above as a mechanism to reform
the indirect tax system.
Fourth, the strength of the budgetary posi-
tion gave the Howard Government the capacity
to significantly, indeed, overcompensate the
‘losers’.
Finally, short-term politics also significantly
constrained the Henry Review, as well as its
implementation, specifically by the exclusion
of consideration of the GST and tax-free
superannuation. As these two, along with
housing, are the principal areas of ‘concession’
in the existing tax system, the reform of which
is fundamental to the tax policy objectives of
efficiency and equity, this was a very signifi-
cant constraint. However, Henry did still, nev-
ertheless, recommend taxing superannuation
earnings in retirement.
Although this excursion through tax review
and reform efforts since Asprey has been brief,
it should serve nonetheless to make the point
that increasingly short-term, adversarial poli-
tics has at best compromised, and at worst
wasted, the many opportunities that have
emerged or been created for genuine reform.
3. Where Is Australia Now?
Although there has been significant progress in
some areas, the bottom line is that Australians
are left with a system that still visibly fails the
three original, key objectives of tax policy, let
alone to have adequately adjusted to the dra-
matic shifts in the global and domestic eco-
nomic and social environment and the related
policy challenges over that period or now in
prospect.
The system has become even more compli-
cated, less efficient and inequitable as, essen-
tially, the outcome of a series of mostly ad hoc
decisions, while sometimes in an attempt at
genuine reform, but more generally to just
raise revenue, to close ‘loopholes’ and so on.
For example, in terms of complexity, on a
rough count, the tax law is now approximately
5,500 pages, compared with about 1,200 in
1980—it was only 24 pages when the first
income tax act was introduced in 1915.
Other measures also suggest significant
costs due to complexity. Total taxpayer com-
pliance costs now run somewhere between
1.5–2 per cent of gross domestic product
(GDP), and relative to revenue collected busi-
ness compliance costs could be as high as 10
per cent (higher for small businesses), about
double that for individuals. There is also
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evidence of greater reliance on tax agents by
individuals. Over two thirds of taxpayers use
tax agents, the second-highest number in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
In terms of administration costs, it appears
that the ATO and state revenue offices could be
costing as much as 1 per cent of revenue col-
lected, while Centrelink could cost some 3.5
per cent of payments made (these estimates
exclude costs of policy formulation and of
other agencies involved in the collection of
revenue and administration of transfers).
Many factors have been identified as con-
tributing to this complexity, most importantly:
• the large number of taxes levied by three
levels of government, many of which raise
little in revenue and lack consistency in
rates, bases and in the administration of
similar taxes by different governments;
• the many differences in income tests used to
determine eligibility for different transfers
and concessions;
• interactions between tax and transfer
systems that obscure the signals about
rewards for working and saving;
• the extensive array of tax expenditures,
many of which are designed to achieve non-
tax policy objectives through the tax system;
• inconsistencies in the taxation of different
assets and entities and the multiplicity of
arrangements for pricing Australia’s natural
resources; and
• the difficulties in taxing cross-border flows
of income.
In terms of inefficiency, the marginal excess
burden analysis emphasises that the system
overall is much more inefficient than others,
with the most inefficient taxes currently
imposed by the states, especially gambling and
insurance taxes, stamp duties, motor vehicle
registration, and payroll tax.
Somewhat ironically, the states and local
governments have access to one of the most
efficient taxes, namely land tax, but they
generally have managed its use poorly. Inter-
estingly, the Australian Capital Territory Gov-
ernment recently has moved to improve the
efficiency of its tax base by starting to
phase down stamp duties and replacing them
with a land tax.
At the Commonwealth level, corporate
taxes are particularly inefficient, mostly
because it is applied to capital that is highly
mobile due to the international competition for
funds.
The inequities in the tax system are also
well recognised. The system encourages
wealth accumulation by borrowing and specu-
lating, while penalising working and saving
through deposits. It imposes the highest rates
of tax on wage and salary income and savings
in deposits, while imposing substantially lower
rates on the same amount of income from other
investments (property, shares and other assets),
and particularly if those investments are
funded by debt. The real effective rate of tax
on savings can vary from negative (for those
who are highly leveraged on property and
superannuation savings by top-rate taxpayers)
to almost 80 per cent on bank and building
society deposits. The last five budgets of the
Howard Government significantly lessened the
burden on high wage and salary earners, while
leaving those lower down the income scale at
the mercy of the interaction of the tax and
transfer systems, such that they may face
effective marginal tax rates as high as 60
per cent, or even more.
Perhaps the points can be more effectively
made, and the politics quite obvious, with a
few specific examples. The GST exemptions,
especially on education and health, have pro-
duced innumerable examples of inequity and
inefficiency; for instance, a school excursion to
Uluru is exempt, but not families who take
their kids there because they did not go to a
school that offered an excursion.
The mining tax was introduced while main-
taining state royalties, which was both an
unstable policy and guaranteed political diffi-
culties; for example, the states quickly hiked
their royalties in response to the availability of
uncapped minerals resource rent tax credit and
key state governments opposed it anyway.
Also, industry spread rumours that the
superannuation profits of other industries, such
as banking, were likely to be taxed next. This,
in itself, has set back debate because it is
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precisely what could be needed if it means that
company tax could be removed by moving to a
business-level expenditure tax.
The indexation of excises is a mess of incon-
sistencies that is driven by politics: fuel is no
longer indexed, tobacco is indexed to wages,
and alcohol is indexed to the consumer price
index.
Hidden in benchmarks in the Tax Expendi-
ture Statement is the inconsistency between
the taxation of wine (based on value) and beer
and spirits (taxed on volume). However, it is
hard to understand the industry’s resistance to
reform here as the wine equalisation tax is
essentially a luxury tax that makes it difficult
for producers to move up the value chain away
from increasing competition from low-end
South American and (with strong dollar) Euro-
pean producers.
The ‘simpler’ superannuation changes that
were introduced in 2006 were both inequi-
table, in an intergenerational sense, and ineffi-
cient, satisfying banks with free deposits now.
If one steps back and surveys the key fea-
tures and weaknesses of the present tax and
transfer system, which clearly suggest the need
for reform, the following elements could be
emphasised. For a start, it is instructive to
recognise that there are 125 taxes paid by Aus-
tralians annually: 99 levied by the Common-
wealth (recognising many agriculture and food
levies), 25 by state and territory governments,
and one by local government. These revenues
are heavily concentrated, with over 90 per cent
derived from just 10 taxes, reflecting 95
per cent of Commonwealth revenue, over 60
per cent of state and territory revenue, and 100
per cent of local government revenue.
Australia’s overall tax burden is low by
OECD standards, although if employer super-
annuation contributions and private health
insurance premiums (which are paid through
taxes in many OECD countries) are added,
Australia about matches the OECD average.
Yet the country is faced with billions of dollars
of expenditure commitments in the budget out
for years, especially the Gonski education
reforms, National Disability Insurance
Scheme, infrastructure, National Broadband
Network and an ageing population in the
context of limited capacity to cut expenditures
short of a large-scale restructuring of Com-
monwealth and state responsibilities to elimi-
nate duplication.
It is notable that, despite the introduction of
the GST and other adjustments to personal tax,
the ‘tax mix’ has changed little since the
1950s. This is shown by the overreliance on
corporate taxes, with an underreliance on per-
sonal and consumption taxes.
The GST has lost its edge as a growth tax,
applying as it does to only about 60 per cent of
expenditure. Expenditure on items subject to
the GST is declining, both as a share of con-
sumption spending and as a share of GDP, as
the prices of exempt expenditures are growing
faster. Increasing the coverage and possibly
increasing the rate still provide the ‘easiest’
mechanism by which to fund the rapidly
expanding expenditure demands, abolishing
many of the lesser taxes and facilitating further
reform of personal tax, with appropriate com-
pensation. However, any change to the GST
structure and distribution will need to be effec-
tively driven by the states, the political diffi-
culties of which should not be underestimated.
It also should be noted that the costs of
administering the GST by the ATO, mostly
because of exemptions, is as much as $1.36 per
each $1,000 raised, compared with about 94
cents on average for other taxes.
The corporate tax system is in need of par-
ticular review and restructure for a host of
reasons, including the expanding role of mul-
tinationals, changing corporate structures, the
sophistication of financial innovation and the
discriminatory effects of imputation, but
always with an eye on international competi-
tiveness and especially in the light of Austra-
lia’s ever-expanding presence in, and reliance,
on Asia.
The states, territories and local governments
raise about 20 per cent of total tax revenue
through largely inefficient taxes and charges,
some of which such as stamp duties and insur-
ance levies are among the worst taxes. In the
case of both payroll tax and stamp duties and
land taxes, the states have consistently nar-
rowed their tax base, attempting to buy the
support of small businesses and first
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homebuyers. They are now heavily con-
strained with rising expenditure commitments,
especially in health and education, in the
absence of a growth tax and faced with declin-
ing GST revenues. It is hard to see substantial
progress here without a significant restructur-
ing of the Federation, with a clear allocation of
spending responsibilities to a single level of
government and new funding arrangements.
Australia’s transfer system is relatively
cheap and efficiently targeted and delivered by
Western standards, although quite complex as
a result. The effectiveness of the links with the
tax system is still a significant issue, especially
effective marginal tax rate disincentives, and
the level of some benefits, such as NewStart
and the aged pension, probably should be
increased.
Finally, there is important debate to be had
about how well the present tax and transfer
system sits with the range of domestic and
global policy challenges that were identified
by Henry and others, especially sustainability,
and the need to improve productivity, labour
participation and national savings, and to
sustain foreign investment.
The need to reform the tax and transfer
system now should be an urgent priority. The
likely economic, social and environmental
challenges are very real. Specifically, govern-
ments face the medium-term challenges of
making a transition to a low-debt, low-carbon
world, constrained by significantly increasing
demand for public services (education, disabil-
ity, infrastructure etc.), an ageing population,
mounting housing unaffordability and a pro-
ductivity slump in a very competitive global
environment where capital is more mobile and
Australia’s high dollar compounds the nation’s
cost un-competitiveness.
4. Ingredients for Successful Tax and
Transfer Reform
The essential question here is how can Austra-
lia best move forward to achieve genuine and
sustainable tax and transfer reform in what has
become an extremely short-term-focused,
adversarial policy and political environment. If
governments are left to muddle on pretty much
as in the past, the tax and transfer system
threatens to become even more dysfunctional.
Yet both sides of politics seem to have
severely constrained their options and capacity
to respond already. Both are opposed to any
change to the GST, housing or superannuation
(the big concession areas), and both are com-
mitted to reducing personal and company taxa-
tion, even in the face of increasing demands
for public services and the major structural
policy challenges that have been identified
above.
Significant reform necessarily will imply
winners and losers, and any reform package
will necessitate that some of those losers will
need to be compensated. With the current and
prospective structural weakness of the budget
and the significant spending commitments and
expectations already made by both sides of
politics, stretching over the next decade or so,
whoever is in government is most unlikely to
ever enjoy the budgetary capacity to ‘buy’elec-
toral support via heavy compensation for sub-
stantial reform.
I believe this situation now calls for a ‘big’
package, calling for some ‘big’ and ‘decisive’
new thinking. A sizeable ‘tax mix’ switch
probably will be fundamental, with a move
away from corporate taxes to (say) a business
spending tax and an increased GST that is
extended across all expenditure, as well as
expanded land taxes, funding a reform of per-
sonal taxation and the abolition of a host of the
most inefficient taxes, to mention only the
likely key elements.
Other improvements include a big step
forward in terms of simplification, a dramatic
improvement in efficiency, a sizeable adjust-
ment to inequality, and a new tax and transfer
system that clearly recognises the magnitude
and significance of the policy challenges ahead
of us for the next several decades, and that puts
us in the best situation to handle them. No
more muddling through. No more potholing.
No more ad hockery.
The Abbott Government has cast its com-
mitment to a White Paper review process in
terms of wanting to ‘finish the job that the
Henry Review started’. Many, probably the
most hopeful, have interpreted this to mean a
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desire to mull over and to sift through the
remaining recommendations of the Henry
Review, with a view to putting together a
reform ‘package’ that could be taken to the
next election, seeking a mandate to make the
necessary changes in a second and/or subse-
quent term(s) of government. As such, it would
fit well with what I believe will be the strategy
outlined in the May budget, namely not an
attempt to return the budget to surplus as soon
as possible, but more likely (say) a 10-year
strategy to achieve the desired budget surplus
of (say) 1 per cent of GDP by around 2023/
2024.
However, is such a process consistent with
the likely politics of the period? Even if a
viable tax and transfer package could be
finalised before the next election, how much of
it would have to be ‘compromised’ as the poli-
tics unfold? Or, to pose the question another
way, how can politics be kept out of the
process? The experience since Asprey cer-
tainly does not give one much hope, although
it is worth drawing on the experience since
Asprey to identify the key ingredients for a
successful reform process.
Let us begin with an ‘ideal world’. First, and
foremost, there is a need for political leader-
ship. Indeed, very strong and persuasive lead-
ership might be enough in itself to drive
through reform. However, what is really
needed is for someone to ‘own’ and ‘drive’ the
reform process, to set the agenda, to control
the development and explanation or selling of
the detail, to challenge others to fall in behind,
in support, and to manage the delivery.
Unfortunately, there are not many
examples of this sort of leadership or capac-
ity in the nation’s parliaments. However,
Rudd came close in his early days. I recall
the enthusiasm with which a newly elected
Rudd promised a substantive response to the
challenge of climate change. He was quite
explicit as to the process and its timing: ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, receive the Garnaut
Report, to be quickly followed by a Green
Paper, a White Paper, introduction of the leg-
islation into the Parliament, and if that failed
to pass, a double dissolution to win the right
to force it through.
Rudd had the political mandate, and his
strategy enjoyed widespread community
support. All went well until he baulked at the
last, double-dissolution hurdle, and as they say
‘the rest is history’. The reform and the con-
stituency for that significant policy change was
not only lost, but so too was his Prime
Ministership.
Second, a political leader needs other
‘champions’ to back the cause, from academia
and from others across the community who are
not just pushing their own vested interests.
Third, it is important to recognise a signifi-
cant constraint on building a constituency for
reform. Nearly all the changes will have
winners and losers, yet in Australia’s political
system the losers tend to be more vocal than
the winners, while the winners are more scep-
tical. It should be obvious, but the key problem
in building a case for tax reform is convincing
the potential winners that reform will lead to
higher income and higher investment. They
know what they have, and it is difficult for
them to accept that they will have more, as
well as more opportunities, as there also will
be benefits in the form of new jobs that do not
exist yet and new business and investment that
do not exist yet.
Finally, there is a need for longer term,
structural thinking and planning. For govern-
ments, this calls for thinking beyond the
forward estimates and the next election. For
political oppositions, it means rising above the
negativity and short-term, opportunistic point-
scoring in order to consider the national inter-
est. For business, it means thinking beyond its
existing capital stock. For unions, it means
thinking of working cooperatively to grow the
pie before asking for a slice. For the account-
ing and legal professions and others in the ‘tax
industry’, it means a significant shift in focus
from seeking to profit from the complexity,
inefficiency and inequity of the system to how
to better serve the greater community ‘good’
(pretty much as dentists did with fluoride).
Then, they all need to work collaboratively in
order to take the broader community along
with them.
Too much to ask, you say? Short-termism,
and particularly short-term politics, will
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inevitably win out! Okay, let us go to the other
extreme and pose the question of whether it is
inconceivable that the Abbott White Paper
might consider, given the overwhelming
importance of the tax and transfer system
moving forward and the likely fierce, negative
politics against whatever will be proposed, that
it would make more sense to consider the
establishment of an independent, permanent,
Tax Commission, an institution designed to be
‘beyond politics’.
Given the nature and constraints of Austra-
lia’s three levels of government, and specifi-
cally given that any significant tax and transfer
reform package would need to be based on an
agreement between those levels of govern-
ment, preferably in the context of a reform
agreement relating to the spending side of the
Federation, to then be ratified by their respec-
tive parliaments, the nature and role of such a
Commission would need to be carefully
detailed and negotiated.
At one level, it simply could be empowered
to provide fiercely independent advice to gov-
ernments as to the key elements of a reform
package, based on capacities and funding to
seek submissions, commission essential
research etc.—a productivity commission-type
role. At the extreme, it could be truly indepen-
dent of governments, with powers, in consul-
tation with governments but only subject to
broad parliamentary oversight, to analyse,
develop, educate and deliver the reform pack-
age(s) it believes necessary over the next
several decades—an RBA-type role.
You might say too extreme? I can remember
sitting in the Monetary Policy Committee
meetings of the Fraser Cabinet, day in, day
out, watching a controlling group of farmers
setting interest rates (official and bank) and
Australia’s exchange rate, as a matter of their
agrarian politics, when it seemed a far cry to
imagine an independent RBA with the power
and responsibility to set the official interest
rate and to intervene in exchange markets, as
they believed necessary. But, it happened.
I wrote a significant academic paper on the
subject in 1980 that, to be kind, was greeted
with some suspicion as to what planet I had
moved to. However, the thinking was consis-
tent with, and driven by, the work of a fiercely
independent Campbell Inquiry and an
in-government task force that handled the
implementation of its recommendations by
breaking them up into ‘bite-sized’ chunks for
consideration by Cabinet, over time. This was
handled in a way, built on a formidable com-
munity consultation and education process,
that built irreversible expectations that in turn
ensured that, before too long, enough deregu-
lation and reform had occurred to virtually
guarantee the emergence of a renewed RBA
and market-determined interest rates and
exchange rates and the licensing of a host of
new banks and financial institutions, irrespec-
tive of which side of politics governed the
country.
There are a couple of points to ponder in
considering the possibility of a Tax Commis-
sion. Is genuine tax and transfer reform too
important to be left to politicians? Are interest
rates or tax and transfers more important to the
economy moving forward? Assuming that
Abbott wants to be remembered for a couple of
key achievements in his Prime Ministership, it
is hard to imagine a more lasting legacy than
genuine, innovative tax and transfer reform.
To conclude, Australia needs a way to
depoliticise the issue of tax and transfer
reform, short of hanging around a pond like
King Arthur, waiting for some tart to deliver
Excalibur!
July 2014.
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